首页> 外文期刊>International Journal of Service and Computing Oriented Manufacturing >The mechanism of politically-connected managers on technological innovation for small and medium high-tech enterprises - empirical evidence from listed firms in Chinese SMEs stock market
【24h】

The mechanism of politically-connected managers on technological innovation for small and medium high-tech enterprises - empirical evidence from listed firms in Chinese SMEs stock market

机译:具有政治联系的经理人对中小型高科技企业技术创新的机制-来自中国中小企业股票市场上市公司的经验证据

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

It is a widespread phenomenon of enterprises in many countries to seek and establish certain contact with the government. This study selects high-tech enterprises listed in the small board as samples, 2007-2010 as inspection interval, using structural equation modelling to explore the mechanism of political connections on technological innovation for small and medium high-tech enterprises. The results show that politically-connected managers can play a positive role on technological innovation for small and medium high-tech enterprises. External financing and entry barriers play indirect role of conduction of political connections on technological innovation, that is to say, political connections affect technological innovations of enterprises via external financing and entry barriers indirectly. Government subsidies play no indirect conduction of political connections on technological innovation of enterprises.
机译:寻求并与政府建立一定联系是许多国家企业普遍存在的现象。本研究以2007-2010年在小板上市的高新技术企业为样本,以结构方程模型探讨中小高科技企业技术创新的政治联系机制。结果表明,具有政治联系的经理人可以在中小型高科技企业的技术创新中发挥积极作用。外部融资和进入壁垒在技术创新中发挥政治联系的间接作用,也就是说,政治联系通过外部融资和进入壁垒间接影响企业的技术创新。政府补贴不间接影响企业技术创新的政治联系。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号