Complexity analysis of dynamic noncooperative game models for closed-loop supply chain with product recovery

摘要

In this paper, we consider a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with product recovery, which is composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. The retailer is in charge of recollecting and the manufacturer is responsible for product recovery. The system can be regarded as a coupling dynamics of the forward and reverse supply chain. Under different decision criteria, two noncooperative game models: Stackelberg game model and peer-to-peer game model are developed. The dynamic phenomena, such as the bifurcation, chaos and sensitivity to initial values are analyzed through bifurcation diagrams and the largest Lyapunov exponent (LLE). The influences of decision parameters on the complex nonlinear dynamics behaviors of the two models are further analyzed by comparing parameter basin plots, and the results show that with the improvement of retailer's competitive position, the CLSC system will be more easier to enter into chaos.