In today's globalized economy, emerging economies face intense pressure to converge their economic policies toward common norms to remain competitive in the marketplace. Yet legal structures, in particular intellectual property rights (IPRs) are curiously withstanding these calls for convergence. This dissertation investigates why legal structures in emerging economies deviate from the convergence norm by examining the problematic process of IPR reform. Highlighted is the role of domestic institutions and their unanticipated effects on convergence efforts. Cross-national regression analyses are conducted to assess global correlation trends. To further detail those variables that counteract and encourage reform, comparative analysis of a case of successful convergence, Chile, and one of non-convergence, Mexico is utilized. This research illustrates how a particular set of government institutions can undermine states' abilities to respond to the calls for convergence. The findings indicate that the institutional variables of presidentialism and centralized agency authority, as well as the structural variable of trade negotiations, support IPR reform efforts. However, they are insufficient to secure successful convergence. Rather, the critical causal variable necessary is the existence of a well trained and funded judiciary capable of enforcing relevant legislation. Unlike trade and financial policy convergence which occurs within one branch of government, IPR convergence is contingent on the historical evolution of the judiciary vis-a-vis the executive. The study fills gaps in both the globalization and economic development literatures by illustrating how domestic variables mitigate pressures for policy harmonization.
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