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代数攻击

代数攻击的相关文献在2003年到2022年内共计111篇,主要集中在无线电电子学、电信技术、自动化技术、计算机技术、数学 等领域,其中期刊论文94篇、会议论文17篇、专利文献11796篇;相关期刊44种,包括信息工程大学学报、淮北师范大学学报(自然科学版)、电子学报等; 相关会议12种,包括第四届中国计算机网络与信息安全学术会议(CCNIS2011)、第十二届保密通信与信息安全现状研讨会、第九届全国信息隐藏暨多媒体信息安全学术大会CIHW2010等;代数攻击的相关文献由200位作者贡献,包括王永娟、王韬、韩文报等。

代数攻击—发文量

期刊论文>

论文:94 占比:0.79%

会议论文>

论文:17 占比:0.14%

专利文献>

论文:11796 占比:99.07%

总计:11907篇

代数攻击—发文趋势图

代数攻击

-研究学者

  • 王永娟
  • 王韬
  • 韩文报
  • 张世武
  • 范淑琴
  • 刘会英
  • 徐春霞
  • 赵新杰
  • 陈卫红
  • 刘志高
  • 期刊论文
  • 会议论文
  • 专利文献

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    • 张静
    • 摘要: 首先,本文提出与分解问题等价的一个困难问题:等价分解问题。其次,基于等价分解问题(E-DP)和离散对数问题(DLP),提出了一种无限非交换群上的密钥交换协议。在协议中,通过半直积的运算法则,使共享密钥同时包含两个困难问题。这两个困难问题共同保证了密钥交换协议的抗攻击性。最后利用代数攻击和暴力攻击进行分析,证明了协议具有较高的安全性。
    • 王勇; 郑东; 赵庆兰; 李路阳; 师宇
    • 摘要: 布尔函数可以作为流密码和分组密码中的非线性部件,对密码系统的安全性有着重要的影响.旋转对称布尔函数是一类在输入进行循环移位下输出值保持不变的布尔函数.此类函数包含了很多具有良好密码学性质的布尔函数.如何构造具有最优代数免疫度的奇变元旋转对称布尔函数是布尔函数研究中的一个被广泛关注的问题.针对此问题沈黎鹏和陈克非给出了一种构造方案,所构造的函数非线性度在变元个数n> 23时是同类构造中最高的,但是在n≤23时是不确定的.本文给出一种新的构造方案,所构造的函数具有较高的非线性度,在变元个数n≤23时非线性度是同类构造中最高的,并且在某些情况下其代数次数能达到最高值n-1.此外,在变元个数为11, 13, 15时,利用Simon Fischer的程序验证了新构造的布尔函数具有几乎最优的抵抗快速代数攻击的能力.本文的构造可以为对称密码算法(尤其是利用小变元布尔函数作为非线性部件的轻量级密码算法)的设计提供更多可选择的密码函数.
    • 李浪; 刘波涛
    • 摘要: 目前,适合资源约束的轻量级密码算法已成为研究热点.提出一种低资源、高性能与高安全性的新轻量级分组密码算法Surge.Surge密码分组长度为64位,使用64位、80位和128位3种密钥长度,且基于SPN结构.轮函数分为5个模块,密钥扩展模块采用无扩展方式;轮常数加模块采用0到15的数字组合成轮常数,构造高效且高度混淆的轮常数加变换;列混合模块利用易于硬件实现的(0,1,2,4)组合矩阵,从而可以在有限域GF(24)上构造硬件实现友好型矩阵.将Surge算法在FPGA上进行了实现,实验结果表明,相对于目前SPN结构的轻量级密码算法,Surge算法占用的面积资源更小,同时有着良好的加密性能;安全性实验证明了Surge可以有效抗差分与线性攻击、代数攻击.%Lightweight cryptography algorithm has become a hot research.The paper presented a new lightweight block cipher algorithm named Surge.Surge has low resource,high performance and high security.Block length of Surge cipher is 64 bits.Its variable key uses 64,80 or 128-bit length.Surge is based on the SPN structure.The round function is divided into 5 modules.Key expansion module is no expansion.Round-constants add module uses 0 to 15 to combine so that it can achieve efficient and highly confused round-constrants add operation.MixColumn module uses (0,1,2,4) to composite hardware-friendly matrix on the GF (24).Low resource and highly efficient of Surge is attained by this novel design.Surge is implemented and downloaded in FPGA.Experimental results show that it has smaller area resources and better cryptographic properties.The security expriment proves that surge can be against differential and linear attacks,algebraic attacks.
    • 马云飞; 王韬; 陈浩; 黄长阳
    • 摘要: 立方攻击是一种基于高阶差分理论的新型代数攻击方法,只要输出比特能够表示成关于明文变量和密钥变量的低次多元方程,立方攻击就有可能攻破此类密码.近年来立方攻击研究迅速开展,取得了一系列重要的成果.首先介绍了立方攻击原理及其变种:非线性立方攻击、立方测试和动态立方攻击;总结了基于中间状态泄露和基于故障信息泄露的两种旁路立方攻击模型及容错机制,给出了立方攻击扩展研究内容;最后分析了已有研究的不足并预测了下一步可能的研究方向.
    • 陈涛; 卓泽朋
    • 摘要: 代数攻击成功的关键在于求解布尔函数的低次零化子.对布尔函数零化子的两种求法进行分析,并给出实例和解法过程,在此基础上,得出两种求法的差异和复杂度.%The key to the success of algebraic attacks is to solve the annihilator of Boolean functions.Firstly, we analyzing two methods of solution annihilators of Boolean functions,than examples and solution processes are given,on this basis,we can get any difference and complexity of the two methods.
    • 陈涛1; 卓泽朋1
    • 摘要: 代数攻击成功的关键在于求解布尔函数的低次零化子.对布尔函数零化子的两种求法进行分析,并给出实例和解法过程,在此基础上,得出两种求法的差异和复杂度.
    • 赵庆兰; 刘航; 郑东
    • 摘要: The support set of the Majority function is revised according to new vector sets given by three-type odd numbers and vector sets sorted by Hamming weight,and a new construction of odd-variable Boolean functions with optimal algebraic immunity based on Reed-Muller code is proposed.It can be proved that the constructed odd-variable function has optimum algebraic immunity degree and high nonlinearity.With the help of computer programs,it is verified that,as the input variable n =11,13,15,this function has near sub optimal ability to resist fast algebraic attacks.%根据按照奇数的3种情况分别给出的新向量集合和按照汉明重量划分的向量集合,对“择多”函数支撑集加以修改,提出了一种新的基于RM码最优代数免疫度的奇元布尔函数的构造方案.证明了该构造方案生成的奇元布尔函数具有最优的代数免疫度以及较高的非线性度.利用计算机程序验证了输入变量值n=11,13,15时所构造的函数具有接近次优的抵抗快速代数攻击的能力.所构造的奇元布尔函数为设计流密码的非线性组件提供了一种选择.
    • 凌杭; 吴震; 杜之波; 王敏; 饶金涛
    • 摘要: 为评估EPCBC密码的安全性,在汉明重的基础上,提出一种EPCBC密码代数侧信道攻击方法,并研究影响攻击效率的因素.构建该算法的代数方程组,通过功耗泄露情况推断汉明重,将其转化为代数方程组,并利用解析器求解密钥.实验结果表明,该方法在已知明密文和未知明密文条件下均可恢复出完整密钥.%In order to assess the security of EPCBC cipher,this paper proposes an algebraic side channel attack method based on Hamming weight,and studies factors which affect the attack efficiency.The algebraic equations of the algorithm are constructed.The power leakage is collected to infer the Hamming weight and it is transformed into an algebraic equation.The solver is used to solve the key.Experimental results show that the complete key can be recovered in the known-plaintext scenario or not.
    • 马云飞; 王韬; 陈浩; 黄长阳
    • 摘要: 针对SIMON现有故障攻击中存在的故障深度小、手工推导复杂等问题,给出一种代数故障攻击(AFA)方法.首先给出SIMON核心运算‘&’代数表示方法并构建全轮正确加密代数方程组;其次注入故障并将故障信息表示为代数方程,提供故障已知和故障未知两种模型,给出两种模型故障表示方法;最后利用CryptoMinisat-2.9.6解析器求解方程组恢复密钥.实验结果表明:利用单比特故障对SIMON32/64进行攻击,故障位置选取第26轮,故障已知和未知模型仅需5个和6个故障即可恢复全轮密钥;利用n比特宽度故障对SIMON128/128进行攻击,故障位置选取第65轮,两种模型均只需2个故障即可恢复全轮密钥.此外,对比故障已知和未知模型发现,随故障数递增密钥求解时间的决定因素将由故障信息量变为方程组计算量.%To solve the problems of small fault depth and complex manual deduction in previous fault attacks on SIMON,an Algebraic Fault Attack (AFA) method was proposed.Firstly,Correct equations of full-round SIMON encryption was established based on the algebraic representation of SIMON core operation' &'.Then faults were injected into the internal states and two models were provided for fault representation based on whether attackers knew the exact fault information or not.Finally,a CryptoMinisat-2.9.6 solver was used for round-keys recovery.The simulation results show that the fault-known and fault-unknown model need 5 and 6 faults to recover the entire key set with single-bit faults injected in the 26th round of SIMON32/64.As for SIMON128/128,two models both need only 2 faults to recover the entire key set with n-bit length faults injected in the 65th round.Moreover,it can be found that the influencing factor of average solving time will change from fault information to computation with fault number growing.
    • 姜晓; 马昌社
    • 摘要: HB协议是一类对计算要求极低的认证协议,能够抵抗量子攻击,非常适合于移动和物联网环境,而这种无线通信环境要求HB协议应该具有抗中间人攻击的能力.基于此,设计了一种对HB#协议进行中间人攻击的代数分析方法,在这种代数攻击中,认证密钥可以被快速地恢复.这一攻击方法建立在Z2中一类多元二次方程组的解的基础之上,首先找到了这类方程组有解的充分必要条件和求解算法,然后利用这一结果对HB#协议进行中间人攻击.%HB-like protocols are such a kind of authentication protocols that require low computational resource and promise to resist quantum attacks.They are especially suitable for mobile applications and the Internet of Things (IoT).However,the wireless communications in these environments have compelled that HB-like protocols should be able to resist the man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks.In this vein,this paper proposes an algebraic MIM attack to a recently presented HB# authentication protocol which is claimed to resist MIM attacks.During this attack,the authentication keys can be totally recovered efficiently.The proposed attacking method is based on the solutions to a system of quadratic equations of multi-variables over Z2.Hence,the necessary and sufficient conditions for this system of equations being solvable have been found in advance.Then,an algebraic attack to HB# protocol has been presented accordingly.
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