Serving Two Masters

摘要

This paper will provide a conceptual framework and guide for military officers to help them in their congressional liaison responsibilities. It is not unusual for military officers to not agree with portions of the President's budget as submitted to Congress. How should military officers address their concerns with Congress and still maintain loyalty to the administration. There appears to be a void of agreed upon norms or standards to assist military officers fulfill their obligations to both the administration and Congress, and at the same time sustain strong civil- military relationships. The lack of formal training and agreed upon norms leaves military officers much latitude interpreting their obligations. Certain costs to civil-military relations are incurred when military leaders contest portions of the President's budget before Congress. These costs can damage the relationships between military and administration leaders. Military leaders can keep these costs low if they skillfully balance their obligations between the executive and legislative branches. The paper will look at historical precedents, Constitutional guidance, and current budget obligations to assess the current guidelines. Assuming these current guidelines are insufficient, the paper will propose a conceptual framework to assist military officers effectively balance their obligations between the two branches. An analysis of the Joint Chiefs testimony in 1998 before the Senate Armed Services Committee will highlight aspects of the conceptual framework.