Vietnam 1964-1965: Escalation versus Vietnamization. ACSC Quick-Look 05- 03

摘要

In 1964 President Lyndon Johnson faced the defining decision of his administration, whether to abandon South Vietnam to Communist insurgents or to escalate U.S. troop levels and roles in fighting the Communists. Even before Johnson took office in the wake of President Kennedy's assassination, advisors assessed that the Communist Viet Cong were winning the war in the South. Early in his administration, Johnson focused on an aggressive and liberal domestic agenda designed to transform the role of government and the condition of vast segments of U.S. society. The last thing that he needed or wanted was a protracted war to steal the momentum from his domestic economic and social programs. The American president also did not want to appear weak or soft on Communism either at home or abroad. Johnson believed that the insurgency in South Vietnam was part of a larger global ideological struggle that pitted liberal democratic systems against a monolithic Communist threat. In this context, South Vietnam's fall to Communist insurgents could threaten the very fabric of American society. The assassination of South Vietnam's President Diem in November 1963 to make way for a military regime did not endear the government to the people of South Vietnam. Like the Catholic Diem, who failed to connect with the predominantly Buddhist population, the military leaders who took control after the coup complicated matters by perpetuating corruption and failing to take the war to the Viet Cong insurgents. The effectiveness of the gradually professionalizing South Vietnamese Army deteriorated rapidly as soldiers in the field lost confidence in their leaders and the government. In a matter of months, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam lost credibility with the population it was supposed to defend and with its American advisors. This report examines Johnson's decision to escalate the war, and the factors that contributed to the U.S. failure. Implications for operations in Iraq are included.7.