Operational Level Intelligence: An Alternate Approach

摘要

This study considers the question: is current doctrine on operational levelintelligence adequate for development of a joint theater intelligence architecture. Two major subordinate questions are: (a) What is the current doctrine; and (b) What is 'adequate' in terms of both doctrinal support to procedures and the intelligence needed by an operational commander. The role of doctrine is first described, then existing statements of intelligence doctrine as found in JCS and Service publications are examined. Next, there is an assessment of theater intelligence procedures and organizations currently employed by some of the Unified Commands. The second question is answered by examining the relationship of current procedures to stated doctrine and by investigating the nature of operational level intelligence. The author concludes that current doctrine on operational level intelligence is not adequate for the development of a joint theater intelligence architecture. Neither published doctrine nor unified command practices meet the necessary criteria for military doctrine. But the root cause for the inadequacy is the failure to properly define operational level intelligence. Existing definitions are mere tautologies, and descriptions of the concept focus on intelligence management, not on the nature of operational level intelligence itself. An alternative approach to the problem is offered by defining operational level intelligence in terms of enemy operational level linkages instead of friendly ones, and the effect of this redefinition on future doctrinal formats is discussed.