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Negotiation issues in forming public-private partnerships for brownfield redevelopment: Applying a game theoretical experiment

机译:建立棕地重建的公私合作伙伴关系中的谈判问题:应用博弈论实验

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The redevelopment of a brownfleld can provide a range of societal, environmental but also economic benefits for a number of entities. In the Netherlands (and elsewhere), public-private partnerships are common practice for such projects, because of two main reasons. First, limitations to public funding have led governments to invite the private sector into various long-term arrangements for capital-intensive projects. Second, a comprehensive approach for the whole brownfield area may be more efficient and profitable, compared to piecemeal development via interventions by individual owners. This article investigates, with respect to brownfield redevelopment, the interaction behavior of two key parties in forming partnerships: the municipality and a private developer. It is assumed that, apart from their mutual interest to redevelop the brownfield area, they will have different interests as well. In order to indicate their specific interest and the negotiation outcome regarding the forming of a public private partnership, this paper makes use of an experimental game theory approach. Three specific negotiation issues were analyzed in our research: a building claim, future land use and reparcelling of the land. In addition, this paper suggests an eight-step procedure to conduct a game theoretical experiment. A survey was conducted in order to gather the required data for the experiment. The data have been used to estimate the payoffs variations between the two key parties in the mentioned negotiation games. Finally, by comparing sub game perfect Nash equilibrium generated game outcomes and direct expected outcomes of respondents, this paper experimentally proves that the game theoretical analysis provides a valid representation of a real world brownfield redevelopment negotiation within the Dutch institutional-economic context. The outcome of the experiment confirms the Dutch tradition of public private partnerships in urban development practice, with public and private bodies willing to share financial risks and returns in these projects. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:棕地的重建可以为许多实体提供一系列的社会,环境以及经济利益。在荷兰(和其他地方),由于两个主要原因,公私伙伴关系是此类项目的普遍做法。首先,公共资金的局限性导致政府邀请私营部门为资本密集型项目进行各种长期安排。其次,与通过个体所有者的干预进行零星开发相比,针对整个棕地区域的综合方法可能更有效,更有利。本文针对棕地再开发,研究了建立伙伴关系的两个关键方:市政当局和私人开发商的互动行为。假定除了重新开发棕地地区的共同利益外,他们还将有不同的利益。为了表明他们的特殊兴趣和关于建立公私合伙企业的谈判结果,本文采用了实验性博弈论方法。在我们的研究中,分析了三个具体的谈判问题:建筑物索赔,未来的土地使用和土地重新分配。另外,本文提出了进行游戏理论实验的八步程序。为了收集实验所需的数据进行了调查。该数据已用于估计上述谈判游戏中两个关键方之间的收益差异。最后,通过比较子博弈完美的纳什均衡产生的博弈结果和受访者的直接预期结果,本文通过实验证明了博弈论分析为荷兰制度经济背景下的真实世界棕地再开发谈判提供了有效的代表。实验的结果证实了荷兰在城市发展实践中公私合营的传统,公共和私人机构愿意分担这些项目的财务风险和回报。 (C)2015 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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