CLANS AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: INDIVIDUALIZED CORRUPTION PROSECUTION IN SITUATIONS OF SYSTEMIC CORRUPTION

摘要

This article argues that current international anti-corruption efforts understand corruption through what is termed the individual actor paradigm, focusing on the prosecution or sanctioning of individuals involved in corrupt practices. The efforts to reduce the supply side of bribes through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and its OECD and UN equivalents and the more recent efforts to tackle the demand side of corruption are important responses to the incredible harm of international corruption; they misdiagnose, however, the dynamics in highly corrupt countries and so fail to adequately address many of the dimensions of corruption. Using the former Soviet republics of Central Asia as a case study, this article shows that anti-corruption efforts face a far more complex problem, that of systemic corruption. In response, an effective anti-corruption strategy must begin with an understanding of the political economy of the developing state, and so requires a more sophisticated approach for the sake of both long-term development and the United States' own geostrategic interests. The article suggests modifications to current anti-corruption legislation, and more importantly, urges anti-corruption efforts be integrated into U.S. foreign policy through a comprehensive, strategic approach that coordinates anti-corruption efforts with other developmental goals.