MODELLING RISK COORDINATION OF SUPPLY CHAINS WITH PUT OPTION CONTRACTS AND SELECTIVE RETURN POLICIES

摘要

To study risk coordination of supply chains, a two-echelon supply chain with one risk-neutral supplier and one risk-averse retailer is constructed, in which the retailer behaves with waste aversion. The retailer's conservative attitude to order results in poor performance of the supplier and the whole supply chain. A new contract which combines put options and selective return policies is developed. The retailer buys option contracts when he places an order, then decides to exercise part or all of them after the sales season so that he can choose the return quantity selectively. The exercise price is equivalent to the wholesale price of merchandise. The result demonstrates that this contract can coordinate the supply chain well and be carried out normally despite the retailer's risk preference being private because the supplier's pricing policy is independent of retailer's risk aversion. The numerical analysis shows that the retailer's expected utility outperforms that of the expected utility under the classical buyback contract.