...
首页> 外文期刊>International and Comparative Law Quarterly >DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS - II. GRAND CHAMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A, B & C v IRELAND, DECISION OF 17 DECEMBER 2010
【24h】

DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS - II. GRAND CHAMBER OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A, B & C v IRELAND, DECISION OF 17 DECEMBER 2010

机译:国际法院和法庭的决定-II。欧洲人权法院大法庭,A,B和C诉爱尔兰,2010年12月17日的决定

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           

摘要

The use of 'European consensus' as a decision-making mechanism of the European Court of Human Rights has been condemned and praised in almost equal measure, On the one hand, some scholars argue that the way in which so-called 'consensus' is identified is generally unsound and lacking in rigour. It is also claimed that European consensus is overly subjective in its nature and, in any case, that it undermines the principle that the Convention has an autonomous meaning determined by the Court and separate to what member States do or interpret it as meaning. On the other hand there are scholars who, while often concerned with the suboptimal methodology adopted in identifying and using European consensus in the decisions of the Court, recognize the method's potential to increase the legitimacy of the Court and its function as a mechanism for the progressive liberalization of the European public order. This reflects the fact that, generally speaking, European consensus has been applied in order to establish an expanded scope of protection for the Convention in areas not expressly mentioned within it or contemplated at the time of its drafting, on the basis that there is an identifiable trend (although, in strict linguistic terms, not an actual 'consensus') among other European States to protect the alleged right. Although respondent States had occasionally attempted to justify their derogation from the European consensus or trend on the basis of an internal consensus - understood as a generally held moral value or judgement within the State in question - those attempts had been unsuccessful prior to the important decision of the Grand Chamber in A, B & C v Ireland. In that case, the Court found that Ireland's extremely restrictive stance on the availability of abortion was justifiable and compatible with the Convention on the basis of an alleged internal consensus (in favour of a very restrictive abortion regime in Ireland) that trumped the European consensus (evidencing a much more liberalized abortion regime). In this article, we argue that the proposition that an internal consensus could 'trump' European consensus is troubling from a constitutionalist perspective.
机译:使用“欧洲共识”作为欧洲人权法院的决策机制受到了几乎相等的谴责和赞扬。一方面,一些学者认为所谓的“共识”是识别出来的声音通常不健全且缺乏严格性。还据称,欧洲共识在本质上过于主观,无论如何,它破坏了《公约》具有法院确定的自主含义,并与成员国的行为或解释的含义分开的原则。另一方面,有些学者经常关注在法院的判决中识别和使用欧洲共识所采用的次优方法,但他们认识到该方法有可能增加法院的合法性及其作为进步机制的功能。欧洲公共秩序的自由化。这反映出这样一个事实,一般来说,已经在欧洲范围内采用共识,以便在公约中未明确提及或在公约起草时未设想的领域中建立对公约的扩大保护范围,其依据是可以确定的其他欧洲国家之间趋向于保护所称权利的趋势(尽管以严格的语言表达,并不是实际的“共识”)。尽管响应国偶尔会尝试根据内部共识(被理解为所涉国家内部普遍持有的道德价值或判断)来证明其对欧洲共识或趋势的克减是正当的,但在做出重大决定之前,这些尝试均未成功。 A,B和C诉爱尔兰大庭。在那种情况下,法院认为爱尔兰在所谓的内部共识(有利于爱尔兰非常严格的堕胎制度)的基础上超过欧洲共识(证明更为自由的堕胎制度)。在本文中,我们认为,从宪法主义的角度来看,内部共识可能“压制”欧洲共识的主张令人不安。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号