A Defense Against Strategy for Memory, Bandwidth Exhausted Sniper Attack and Deanonymization Attack in Tor Network

摘要

Tor network is defined as an onion-routing network which is used for facilitating anonymity and resisting censorship online. The Tor network makes use of the onion routing to transmit the user's information through the virtual circuit which consists of different successive relays. ANovel Traffic Dividing and Scheduling (NTDS) technique was proposed for improving the performance and security of the anonymous communication Tor network by selecting the circuits along with the guard nodes. In NTDS method, the traffic load was distributed to the circuits for detecting thebasic version of sniper attacks in Tor network. However, the network performance was degraded by the efficient sniper attack and bandwidth exhaustion attacks in the Tor networks. Hence, in this paper, a defense against strategy for memory, bandwidth exhausted sniper attack and deanonymizationattack in Tor network is proposed. In this approach, the efficient version of sniper attacks such as memory and bandwidth consumption attacks are effectively prevented by using enhanced adaptive circuit killing method. In addition, the de-anonymization mechanism in Tor network is also improvedby considering the different anonymity metrics which is used for selecting the guard nodes. Finally, the experimental results show that the proposed approach has better performance than the existing NTDS method.