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The Perils of Nominal Targets

机译:名义目标的危险

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A monetary authority can be committed to pursuing an inflation, price-level, or nominal-GDP target, yet systematically fail to achieve the prescribed goal. Constrained by the zero lower bound on the policy rate, the monetary authority is unable to implement its objectives when private sector expectations stray far enough from the target. Low-inflation expectations become self-fulfilling, resulting in an additional Markov equilibrium in which the monetary authority falls short of the nominal target, average output is below its efficient level, and the policy rate is typically low. Introducing a stabilization goal for long-term nominal rates can implement a unique Markov equilibrium without fully compromising stabilization policy.
机译:可以致力于追求通货膨胀,价格水平或名义上的GDP目标的货币权威,但系统地未能达到规定的目标。 受到零钱率的零下税率的限制,货币当局无法在私营部门预期从目标中走得足够远的时候落实其目标。 低通胀预期变得自我实现,导致额外的马尔可夫平衡,其中货币管理局缺少名义目标,平均产出低于其有效水平,税率通常低。 为长期标称率引入稳定目标,可以实施独特的马尔可夫平衡,而不会完全妥协稳定政策。

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