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Exploring the cost effectiveness of land conservation auctions and payment policies

机译:探索土地保护拍卖和支付政策的成本效益

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This article evaluates the cost-effectiveness of the Catchment Care Australian conservation auction. It provides evidence of auction cost effectiveness, and estimates cost savings from two discrete components: (i) the opportunity cost revelation incentive provided by the auction mechanism, and (ii) the improved environmental targeting capacity that results from development of a scientifically based environmental benefits assessment capacity. Results show that there are potentially very large returns associated with the latter component that have been overlooked in the literature. Additionally, transaction costs involved with administering the case study conservation auction and the prior non-auction payment policy are compared. We find that the administration costs for the auction were greater than or equal to those associated with the prior policy. Estimates of relative cost effectiveness across policies are shown to be sensitive to the methods of comparison. In this case study, there is inelastic supply of the last units of environmental benefit. This inelasticity results in large estimated auction comparative cost advantage when the benefit metric is the estimated cost required to achieve auction aggregate environmental benefit. Estimated benefit of the auction is much less when measured as environmental benefits attainable with alternative payment policies subject to the auction budget constraint.
机译:本文评估了Catchment Care澳大利亚保护拍卖的成本效益。它提供了拍卖成本有效性的证据,并从两个不同的方面评估了成本节省:(i)拍卖机制提供的机会成本揭示激励措施,以及(ii)通过开发基于科学的环境效益而提高的环境定向能力评估能力。结果表明,与后者相关的潜在巨大回报在文献中被忽略了。此外,还比较了管理案例研究保护性拍卖和先前的非拍卖付款政策所涉及的交易成本。我们发现,拍卖的管理费用大于或等于与先前政策相关的费用。各种政策的相对成本效益的估算显示出对比较方法敏感。在本案例研究中,最后的环境效益单位缺乏弹性。当收益度量是实现拍卖总环境收益所需的估计成本时,这种无弹性会导致较大的估计拍卖比较成本优势。当以另类付款政策可达到的环境收益来衡量时,拍卖的估计收益要少得多,这要受拍卖预算约束。

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