摘要：The fifth meeting ofthe Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety ended in Nagoya,Japan on 15October 2010 with the adoption of a new environmental treaty,the Nagoya-Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.Developing countries wanted to havesubstantive rules on international liability and redress to address damage resulting from living modifiedorganisms(LMOs)included in the Cartagena Protocol itself,but this proved too contentious to resolve at thetime.The compromise,contained in Article 27,was to negotiate liability and redress rules at a later stage,afterthe entry into force of the Cartagena Protocol.This began in earnest in 2005.The negotiations of theSupplementary Protocol were difficult and were opposed by those with an interest in the production and exportof LMOs.Developing countries and some developed countries,on the other hand,maintained that aninternational regime to deal with damage caused by LMOs was necessary because of the unique risks of LMOsand their transboundary nature,and in order to ensure that those responsible would be held liable.Mostdeveloping countries wanted a binding international regime that would establish substantive rules on civilliability,whereby victims of damage from LMOs can turn to national courts for redress. Instead,because ofcompromises made in the negotiations,the Supplementary Protocol takes an 'administrative approach',whereby response measures are required of the operator (person or entity in control of the LMO) or the competentauthority,if the operator is unable to take response measures.This would cover situations where damage tobiodiversity has already occurred,or when there is a sufficient likelihood that damage will result if timelyresponse measures are not taken.The provision of response measures in the event of damage,or a sufficientlikelihood of damage,resulting from LMOs is the central obligation of Parties to the Supplementary Protocol.However,Parties can still provide for civil liability in their domestic law and the first review of theSupplementary Protocol( five years after its entry into force )will assess the effectiveness ofits provrsion on civilliability.This could trigger further work on an international civil liability regime.Other contentious issuesinclude that of financial security.In cases where damage does occur,a liability regime should ensure that financial resources are available to enable or compensate for necessary measures to redress the damage.The Supplementary Protocol merely retains Parties'right to provide,in domestic law,for financial security.However,the provision on financial security mandates the first meeting of the Parties to the SupplementaryProtocol to request the Secretariat to undertake further work on financial security.ln addition,the first review ofthe Supplementary Protocol includes a review of the effectiveness of the provision on financial security.TheSupplementary Protocol sets the minimum international standards on liability and redress for damage resultingfrom LMOs.Much has actually been left to Parties to determine and implement at the national level. Parties tothe Supplementary Protocol are required to provide,in their domestic law,for rules and procedures that addressdamage. Thus,national legislation on liability and redress should implement and augment the Supplementary Protocol.
