Collectively ranking candidates via bidding in procedurally fair ways

摘要

Different evaluators typically disagree how to rank different candidates due to their idiosyncratic concerns for the various qualities of the candidates. Our ranking mechanism asks all evaluators to submit individual bids assigning a monetary amount for each possible rank order. The rules specify for all possible vectors of such individual bids the collectively binding rank order of candidates and the payments, due to the different evaluators. Three requirements uniquely determine procedurally fair ranking rules as a game form. Only when additionally assuming exogenously given true evaluations of collective rankings, which may be commonly or only privately known, and-in case of private information-beliefs concerning the evaluations by others, this game form determines proper games and allows for (game theoretic) equilibrium analysis. After an illustration, the approach is adjusted to situations where one wants to rank only acceptable sets of candidates thus rendering the mechanism even more attractive.