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Leverage causes fat tails and clustered volatility

机译:杠杆导致胖尾和聚集性波动

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摘要

We build a simple model of leveraged asset purchases with margin calls. Investment funds use what is perhaps the most basic financial strategy, called ‘value investing’, i.e. systematically attempting to buy underpriced assets. When funds do not borrow, the price fluctuations of the asset are approximately normally distributed and uncorrelated across time. This changes when the funds are allowed to leverage, i.e. borrow from a bank, which allows them to purchase more assets than their wealth would otherwise permit. During good times, funds that use more leverage have higher profits, increasing their wealth and making them dominant in the market. However, if a downward price fluctuation occurs while one or more funds is fully leveraged, the resulting margin call causes them to sell into an already falling market, amplifying the downward price movement. If the funds hold large positions in the asset, this can cause substantial losses. This in turn leads to clustered volatility: before a crash, when the value funds are dominant, they damp volatility, and after the crash, when they suffer severe losses, volatility is high. This leads to power-law tails, which are both due to the leverage-induced crashes and due to the clustered volatility induced by the wealth dynamics. This is in contrast to previous explanations of fat tails and clustered volatility, which depended on ‘irrational behavior’, such as trend following. A standard (supposedly more sophisticated) risk control policy in which individual banks base leverage limits on volatility causes leverage to rise during periods of low volatility, and to contract more quickly when volatility becomes high, making these extreme fluctuations even worse.
机译:我们建立了一个带有追加保证金的杠杆资产购买的简单模型。投资基金使用的是最基本的财务策略,即“价值投资”,即系统地尝试购买价格低廉的资产。当资金不借入时,资产的价格波动大致呈正态分布,并且在整个时间上不相关。当资金被允许杠杆化(即从银行借款)时,这种情况发生了变化,这使得它们可以购买超出其财富所允许的更多资产。在繁荣时期,使用更多杠杆的基金会获得更高的利润,从而增加财富并使其在市场中占主导地位。但是,如果在充分利用一个或多个基金的情况下出现了价格下跌的波动,则由此产生的追加保证金通知会使它们卖入已经下跌的市场,从而加剧了价格下跌的趋势。如果基金在资产中持有大量头寸,则可能造成重大损失。反过来,这又导致了波动性的聚集:在崩溃之前,价值基金占主导地位时,它们抑制了波动性;在崩溃之后,当它们遭受严重损失时,波动性很高。这导致了幂律尾部,这既是由于杠杆引发的崩溃,又是由于财富动态引起的聚集性波动。这与以前对胖尾巴和聚集的波动性的解释相反,后者取决于“非理性行为”,例如趋势跟踪。一种标准的(可能更为复杂的)风险控制政策,其中,单个银行对波动率进行杠杆限制会导致波动率较低时杠杆率上升,而当波动率变高时杠杆率会更快收缩,从而使这些极端波动更为严重。

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