To Invite or Not to Invite a Lobby, That Is the Question

摘要

We study a game in which a lobby with verifiable private evidencerndiscloses her evidence to a policy-maker if and only if she agrees to a transferrnthat is proposed by the policy-maker. This setting is motivated by the literaturernof pay-and-lobby politics, which finds that politicians schedule informativernmeetings with lobbyists on the basis of their campaign contributions. We admitrnboth positive transfers (fees) and negative transfers (compensations), whichrnimplies not only that the policy-maker can commit to not listen but also thatrnthe lobby can commit to not talk. In a binary action space, we solve the gamernfor all timings, prior beliefs, information structures, and valuation parameters.rnWe identify the settings in which the policy-maker strategically discouragesrnthe lobby’s participation by announcing an unacceptable transfer. Whetherrn‘burying one’s head in the sand’ increases or decreases welfare depends on therndegree of the policy-maker’s benevolence.