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The Agency Problem: Measures for Its Overcoming

机译:代理问题:克服措施

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As the corporative company type emerged, the two functions of ownership and management are separated. In the companies with a large number of employees the managers are the ones that manage the capital in the best interest of the shareholders. In this type of companies, conflict of interest may occur between the managers and the shareholders. Having more information about the work of the company, managers may use it in making decisions for their own benefit, which on the other hand cannot be as beneficial for the shareholders. Conflict of interest between managers and shareholders leads to so-called agency problem. There are different ways by which shareholders can control the operations of management. Some of the measures that can be used to resolve and prevent this problem are subject of analysis in this paper.
机译:随着公司类型的出现,所有权和管理这两种功能是分开的。在拥有大量员工的公司中,经理是为了股东的最大利益而管理资本的经理。在这类公司中,经理和股东之间可能会发生利益冲突。拥有关于公司工作的更多信息,管理者可以利用它来为自己谋取利益,而另一方面却不能为股东带来利益。经理和股东之间的利益冲突导致所谓的代理问题。股东可以通过多种方式来控制管理层的运作。本文分析了一些可用于解决和预防此问题的措施。

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