Where Lies The Signaling Effect Of The Srp? Announcement Vs. Execution

摘要

Kracher and Johnson (1997 "Repurchase Announcements, Lies and False Signals," Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 16, pp. 1677-1685) argue that companies announcing Share Repurchase Program (SRP) with no intention of repurchasing shares are guilty of either lying or sending false signals. One unique feature of stock repurchase regulation in Taiwan is that the listed firms are required to file a formal execution report within two calendar months following the expiration date. Owing to this distinctive stipulation, we have detailed authorized versus actual repurchase data to observe the execution effect as well as the announcement effect associated with stock repurchase programs on shareholder wealth. Our sample is composed of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) listed firms which have announced SRP during the period from August 7, 2000 through December 31, 2001.