Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity: Comment

摘要

Nondiscrimination clauses, also known as most-favored-customer clauses, make a seller's best terms available to all buyers These clauses, which are frequently found in both final-goods and intermediate-goods markets, allegedly provide the seller witha commitment device not to lower price to future buyers. Well-known examples in the literature are Thomas E Cooper (1986) and David A. Butz (1990). Cooper (1986) shows that nondiscrimination clauses can dampen competition over time by inducing less aggressive pricing on the part of a firm's rivals. Butz (1990) shows that nondiscrimination clauses can solve the well-known time inconsistency problem with durable goods. In both models, nondiscrimination clauses commit the seller to its initial price; if the seller were to offer better terms to a later buyer, all previous buyers would request the same treatment, and the seller's attempt to lower price selectively would be defeated.