首页> 中文期刊> 《科技管理研究》 >合同与关系:中国背景下的项目治理机制——基于委托代理与交易成本理论的分析

合同与关系:中国背景下的项目治理机制——基于委托代理与交易成本理论的分析

         

摘要

Both the project owner and the contractor are the two main parlies in the project. Because of the difference goals and information asymmetry, it is easy to cause agency problems like moral hazard. To use tight and detail terms and highly execution contractual governance is the base to regulate project governance. Relational governance requires the unity of objective, sharing of information and working together aim to set up good cooperate model, to decrease transaction cost, to solute the agency problem and to increase the project management performance. The alternatives influent project contractual governance and relational governance, which includes four factors such as asset specificity, cooperative length, and uncertainty and complexity of projects.%项目业主与承包商构成了项目中两个最主要的主体,它们之间由于目标不一致和信息不对称,容易引发道德风险等代理问题.严密详细条款和严格履行的合同治理,是规范项目治理的基础;目标一致、信息共享和联合行动的关系治理,旨在建立良好的合作模式,降低交易成本,解决代理问题,提高项目管理绩效.影响项目合同治理与关系治理的选择,包括了资产专用性、合作期限、项目不确定性和复杂性四个因素.

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