公平偏好下考虑供应商质量投入的供应链契约协调

摘要

The paper aims at the insufficiency that the traditional bonus-penalty contract based on quantitative criteria cannot adapt to the current demand characteristics of many varieties and small batch and coordinate the supply chain.In the context of fairness preference, this paper builds the bonus-penalty contract based on the product quality criteria provided by suppliers,to study how the contract influences the coordination of supply chain.Assuming the retailer is fairness preferred in the two-echelon supply chain with a manufacturer and a supplier,the paper analyzes two situations, namely, the same and different channel power of supply chain participants.We find that the suppliers and retailers will cooperate in accordance with the contract, get a balanced result and achieve supply chain coordination,when the retailer has the same degree of concern for own income and fairness.Furthermore,the difference of channel power will much affect supply chain overall profit. Finally,a numerical example is given to demonstrate the model.%针对传统的基于数量参考标准的奖励惩罚契约无法适应当下"多品种,小批量"的需求特点实现供应链协调,本文建立公平偏好情况下,以供应商提供产品的质量水平为参考标准的奖励惩罚契约模型,探讨其对供应链协调的影响.假设在由单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链系统中零售商具有公平偏好,分别就供应链内各参与主体渠道力量相等和渠道力量不相等这两种情形进行分析.研究发现零售商对自身收益和对公平的关注程度相同时,供应商和零售商会自愿的按照契约进行合作,取得均衡结果,实现供应链协调,且各参与主体渠道力量的不同会对供应链的整体利润产生显著影响.最后使用算例验证了结论.