The manufacturer′s fairness preference in the fresh agricultural supply chain is included in the research perspective. Based on the consideration of the effective supply and deterioration randomness of the fresh agricultural product, by constructing the Stackelberg game model, the influence of the manufacturer′s fairness preference in the operation of the fresh agricultural supply chain is analyzed and the coordination mechanism based on"risk-sharing&revenue-sharing" is designed. The research indicates that, in the de-centralized decision-making, the different values of manufacturer′s fairness perception coefficient and un-fairness aversion coefficient will exert different influences on the operation of fresh agricultural supply chain, and the sensitive degree of optimal decisions and profits of the fresh agricultural product supply chain to the fairness preference is different from the corresponding non-perishable product supply chain;when the contract parameter satisfies the certain conditions, the designed coordination mechanism can not only realize the perfect win-win and coordination of the fresh agricultural supply chain, but also eliminate the fairness preference of the manufacturer.%将生鲜农产品供应链中生产商的公平偏好纳入研究视角,在考虑生鲜农产品的有效供给和变质随机性的基础上,通过构建Stackelberg博弈模型,分析了生产商的公平偏好对生鲜农产品供应链的运作产生的影响,并设计了基于"风险分担+收益共享"的协调机制.研究表明,在分散决策下,生产商的公平感知系数和不公平规避系数的不同取值会对生鲜农产品供应链的运作产生不同的影响,且生鲜农产品供应链的最优决策和利润对公平偏好的敏感程度与相应的非易腐品供应链不同;在契约参数满足一定的条件下,所设计的协调机制不仅能够实现生鲜农产品供应链的完美共赢协调,还能够消除生产商的公平偏好.
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