一种针对密码芯片 DPA 攻击的安全风险量化分析方法

摘要

针对密码芯片遭受差分功耗分析 DPA（Differential Power Analysis）策略攻击时风险如何量化精确评估的问题，提出一种量化应用模拟分析方法。该方法对正常运行中的密码芯片功率消耗大小的概率分布密度值实行核函数机制理论推导，并引入密钥在获取时攻击分析结构模型与功率消耗大小之间的互通信熵值。实验结果表明，该量化分析方法不仅能精确地验算出与互通信熵值类似的相关度参数，而且能有效地提高密钥芯片风险全方位分析能力。%Aiming at how to estimate the risk of the password chips being attacked with differential power analysis (DPA)in quantified and precise way,this paper proposes a quantitative analysis method for applied simulation.The method makes the theoretical derivation with kernel function mechanism on the probability distribution density value of the power consumption of password chip in normal working process, and introduces the mutual communication entropy between the analysis structure model of the attack during key acquisition and the energy consumption.Experimental results indicate that the quantitative analysis can not only check the relevance parameter similar to mutual communication entropy,but can also effectively improve the full-range analysis capability in regard to key chip risks.