我国的国有企业不仅掌控着国民经济的正常运行,而且肩负着增加就业、缩小贫富差距等社会责任.本文以国有上市公司2008-2014年数据为研究对象,对晋升激励、薪酬激励与国企过度投资的关系进行实证分析,发现晋升激励和薪酬激励都会刺激国企过度投资,晋升激励和薪酬激励对过度投资的影响存在着替代作用;与公益类国企相比,商业类国企有着更加明显的过度投资倾向,更容易受到晋升激励与薪酬激励的影响.因此,在深化国企改革过程中应对不同功能的国企进行分类管理,进一步提高国企特别是商业类国企的投资效率;应充分利用好物质激励和非物质激励两种手段,正确引导国企高管的投资行为;政治晋升要减少"关系晋升"现象,国资委要做好投资者利益的"看门人".%SOEs in our countries not only control the normal operation of national economy, but also take social responsibilities such as increasing employment, narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor.This paper makes an empirical study of the relationship between promotion incentive, salary incentive and over-investment of SOEs based on 2008-2014 data, finding both promotion incentive and salary incentive will urge over-investment of SOEs and these two incentive systems have substitution effect on over-investment;the business SOEs are more inclined to over-investment compared with public interest SOEs, and are more likely to be influenced by promotions incentive and salary incentive.Therefore, during the process of deepening the reform of SOEs, we should make classification management to different functions SOEs to increase efficiency of investment of business SOEs;on the other hand, government should make full use of material incentive and non-material incentive to lead investment of SOEs;promotion incentive should decrease the phenomenon of "relationship promotion", State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission(SASAC) should play the "gatekeeper" role of investors′ interest.
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