现象学伦理学的基础:意向性感受

摘要

胡塞尔在<逻辑研究>中对"意向感受"和"非意向感受"的思考,无论是在他后来的伦理学探讨中,还是在舍勒的伦理学思想中,都具有重要的意义.通过将胡塞尔与舍勒的视域融合,可以发现,意向感受行为现象学不仅是舍勒现象学的质料的价值伦理学基础,而且至少可以是胡塞尔第一个方向上的伦理学的建构基础.%E.Husserl's reflections in Logical Investigations on"intentional feelings"and"non-intentional feelings"are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M.Scheler's thought on ethics.Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler,we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler's phenomenology,but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl's first orientation.