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Essays in Industrial Organization and Econometrics

机译:产业组织与计量经济学论文

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This dissertation consists of three essays, two on estimating dynamic entry games and one on the inference for misspecified models with fixed regressors.;Big box retail stores have large impact on local economies and receive large subsidies from local governments. Hence it is important to understand how discount retail chains choose store locations. In the first two essays, I study the entry decisions of those firms, examine the role of preemptive incentives, and evaluate the impact of government subsidies on those decisions. To quantify preemptive incentives, I model firms' entry decisions using a dynamic duopoly location game. Stores compete over the shopping-dollars of close-by consumers, making store profitability spatially interdependent. I use separability and two-stage budgeting to reduce the state space of the game and make the model tractable. Instead of adopting census geographic units, I infer market divisions from data using a clustering algorithm built on separability conditions. I introduce a `rolling window' approximation to compute the value function and estimate the parameters of the game. The results suggest that preemptive incentives are important in chain stores' location decisions and that they lead to loss of production efficiency. On average, the combined sum of current and future profits of the two firms is lowered by 1 million dollars per store. Finally, I assess the impact of government subsidies to encourage entry when one retailer exits, as happened in the recent crisis. I find that although the welfare loss such exits cause on local economies can be substantial, the average size of observed subsidies is not enough to affect firms' entry decisions. This study is organized as follows. In the first essay, I provide descriptive evidence of preemptive entry in the discount retail industry and explain how I model firms' entry decisions. In the second essay, I describe the estimation strategy and present the counterfactual analyses.;The third essay is joint work with Alberto Abadie and Guido Imbens. Following the work by Eicker (1967), Huber (1967) and White (1980ab; 1982) it is common in empirical work to report standard errors that are robust against general misspecification. In a regression setting these standard errors are valid for the parameter that minimizes the squared difference between the conditional expectation and the linear approximation, averaged over the population distribution of the covariates. In this essay, we discuss an alternative parameter that corresponds to the approximation to the conditional expectation based on minimization of the squared difference averaged over the sample, rather than the population, distribution of the covariates. We argue that in some cases this may be a more interesting parameter. We derive the asymptotic variance for this parameter, which is generally smaller than the Eicker-Huber-White robust variance, and propose a consistent estimator for this asymptotic variance.
机译:本文包括三篇论文,两篇是关于动态进入博弈的估计,另一篇是对带有固定回归变量的错误模型的推论。大型零售商店对当地经济影响很大,并获得了地方政府的大量补贴。因此,了解折扣零售连锁店如何选择商店位置非常重要。在前两篇文章中,我研究了这些公司的进入决策,研究了先发性激励措施的作用,并评估了政府补贴对这些决策的影响。为了量化先发制人的激励措施,我使用动态双头垄断位置博弈对公司的进入决策进行建模。商店与附近消费者的购物美元竞争,从而使商店的获利能力在空间上相互依赖。我使用可分离性和两阶段预算来减少游戏的状态空间并使模型易于处理。我没有采用人口普查地理单位,而是使用基于可分离性条件的聚类算法从数据推断市场划分。我介绍了一个“滚动窗口”近似值,用于计算值函数和估计游戏参数。结果表明,先发制人的激励措施对连锁店的选址决策很重要,并且会导致生产效率下降。平均而言,两家公司当前和未来利润的总和每家商店降低100万美元。最后,我评估了政府补贴对鼓励零售商退出的影响,如最近的危机所发生的那样。我发现,尽管这种退出对当地经济造成的福利损失可能很大,但所观察到的补贴的平均规模不足以影响企业的进入决策。本研究组织如下。在第一篇文章中,我提供了折扣零售行业中先发制人进入的描述性证据,并解释了如何为公司的进入决策建模。在第二篇文章中,我描述了估计策略并提出了反事实分析。第三篇文章是与Alberto Abadie和Guido Imbens共同进行的。继Eicker(1967),Huber(1967)和White(1980ab; 1982)的工作之后,在实证研究中普遍报告了可抵御一般错误指定的标准错误。在回归设置中,这些标准误差对于最小化条件期望值与线性近似值之间的平方差的参数有效,该期望值是在协变量的总体分布上平均的。在本文中,我们讨论了一个替代参数,该参数对应于基于条件的期望值的近似值,该条件基于协方差在样本上而不是总体上的平均分布的平方差的最小值。我们认为在某些情况下这可能是一个更有趣的参数。我们推导出该参数的渐近方差,该方差通常小于Eicker-Huber-White鲁棒方差,并为该渐近方差提出一个一致的估计量。

著录项

  • 作者

    Zheng, Fanyin.;

  • 作者单位

    Harvard University.;

  • 授予单位 Harvard University.;
  • 学科 Economic theory.;Organization theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2015
  • 页码 123 p.
  • 总页数 123
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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