Since 1991, the Philippines has been plagued by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a terrorist organization linked to al-Qaeda. After September 11, 2001, President Gloria Arroyo fervently supported the U.S. global war on terror by linking it with the Philippines' struggle against terrorism. With Philippine cooperation, came considerable U.S. military assistance, training, and intelligence support for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to combat the war on terror's "second-front" in Southeast Asia.;The aim of this five part thesis is to examine the development and effectiveness of U.S. policy in combating the ASG while covering the scope of the George W. Bush Administration from 2001 to 2008. To provide the necessary background for understanding the Abu Sayyaf problem, Chapter I will outline the plight of the Moros in the Philippines under Spanish and American colonial rule from 1521 to 1946. Chapter II will examine the deteriorating conditions of the Moros under Christian Filipino rule from independence to 2001, when they were further marginalized. Chapter III will analyze the developments in U.S. policy towards the Moro problem during the concurrent administrations of President George W. Bush and President Gloria Arroyo. Chapter IV will explore military, economic, and political recommendations for more effective U.S.-Philippine bilateral operations against the ASG.;Chapter V will conclude by examining the future prospects of U.S.-Philippine collaboration against terrorism and its global implications. The anti-ASG effort can be used as a model for other joint counterterrorist operations. Since 2001, U.S. military support in counter-Abu Sayyaf operations has been largely successful despite ASG resistance. Annual U.S. military exercises should not cease until the Philippine government becomes stable enough to finance its own military sufficiently to deal with the counterinsurgency efforts, which may take decades. This thesis asserts that U.S. military support, especially civic action projects, must continue because the Philippines lacks the required resources to effectively address the terrorist insurgencies. Furthermore, the Moro problem can be handled better through post-conflict stabilization efforts, such as economic development and political accommodation in the southern Philippines.
展开▼
