The will in Schopenhauer's system: A new-old reading (Arthur Schopenhauer).

摘要

The basic thesis of Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Representation (WWR) is that the innermost nature of the world is will. By placing the work's center of gravity in Book Two, where Schopenhauer introduces the will in light of epistemological concerns, contemporary scholars interpret the basic thesis primarily as an attempt to reorient the world of appearances in light of Kant's transcendental idealism. I challenge this current standard interpretation by arguing that Schopenhauer's work in its entirety is dedicated to showing the pessimistic consequences of the basic thesis. In effect, I present a new case for a traditional ('old') reading of WWR as an argument that, because the world is will, human projects are without meaning or value.; Chapter 1 introduces Schopenhauer's account of the will in general terms by situating it in the context of current theories of action. The second chapter critically examines the strongest textual basis for the current standard interpretation, namely, the account of the will in Book Two of WWR, an account that presents the will as addressing concerns stemming from Kant's epistemology. I argue that this account is only provisional, and that Schopenhauer significantly emends it in the course of the work. Chapter Three examines the status of the Platonic Ideas in Book Three of WWR and demonstrates how their inclusion in Schopenhauer's system underscores rather than mitigates his doctrine of pessimism. Chapter Four presents the final piece of the argument for the traditional reading of WWR by turning to its fourth and final book, containing Schopenhauer's 'asceticism,' in order to demonstrate not only the full significance of the thesis that the world is will but also Schopenhauer's rhetorical reasons for not disclosing its full significance before this final book.