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Research on the prevention mechanism of illegal reduction of shareholding of senior executives in Listed Enterprises : Analysis based on the Model of Dynamic Game of Incomplete Information

机译:上市企业高级管理人员股权责任股权的预防机制研究:基于不完备信息动态游戏模型的分析

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摘要

From the perspective of game theory, this paper attempts to demonstrate whether the establishment of a more perfect market supervision mechanism is a reasonable prevention mechanism for senior executives to reduce their illegal holdings. At the practical level, the specific measures to establish the corresponding mechanism are given. We hope to find a more perfect market supervision mechanism to help the securities market and related enterprises to achieve sound development.
机译:从博弈论的角度来看,本文试图证明建立更完美的市场监督机制是高级管理人员减少非法持有的合理预防机制。 在实际水平,给出了建立相应机制的具体措施。 我们希望能够找到更完美的市场监督机制,以帮助证券市场和相关企业实现合理的发展。

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