Product quality control strategy of distribution channel in supply chain based on hotelling game

摘要

Based on hotelling game analysis, this paper constructs the Stackelberg leader-follower strategy model of distribution channel in three-echelon supply chain, studies how to make product quality control strategy when the manufacturer exists two situations of decentralized decision and centralized decision. We analyze different parameter variables how to affect making product quality control strategy in supply chain of three types of channel structure (traditional retail channel, electric direct channel, mixed channel). Through the model analysis, our paper will demonstrate that: when the manufacturer makes decentralized decision, with the increasing of product quality level, added service value and wholesale price, the retail price will increase; with the increasing of added service value, elasticity of traditional retail channel, and waiting cost, the product quality level will also increase; the product quality level in traditional retail channel and electric direct channel is a "substitution effect" relationship. When the manufacturer makes centralized decision, with the increasing of the difference of elasticity in traditional retail channel and electric direct channel, and retailer's added service value, the manufacture will provide much higher product quality level; with the increasing of transportation cost in traditional retail channel and waiting cost in electric direct channel, the product quality level will decrease. Above all, our conclusions will indicate the further application direction in practice.