The Impact of Executive Pay Gap on RD: Based on the Perspective of Financing Constraints

摘要

This paper selects the panel data of China's GEM listed companies in 2013-2018 as a sample. Based on the tournament theory, it examines the impact of the internal compensation gap of the executive team on the R&D. The research shows that under the full sample, the internal salary gap of the senior management team of the GEM listed companies is significantly positively correlated with the R&D intensity. In addition, this paper uses the SA index to calculate the degree of financing constraints to further group the samples of China's GEM listed companies. The study finds that the impact of the executive pay gap between the sample of companies with strong financing constraints and the sample of companies with weak financing constraints on R&D exists certain differences: the positive correlation between the executive compensation gap and R&D in the sample of companies with weak financing constraints will be further enhanced, while the incentive effect of the executive compensation gap on R&D is weakened in the sample of companies with strong financing constraints.