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Distinguishing Attack and Second-Preimage Attack on Encrypted Message Authentication Codes (EMAC)

机译:在加密消息认证代码(EMAC)上的区分攻击和第二次前缀攻击

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In this paper we show that distinguisher on CBC-MAC can be applied to Encrypted Message Authentication Code (EMAC) scheme. EMAC scheme in general is vulnerable to distinguishing attack and second preimage attack. Distinguishing attack simulation on AES-EMAC using 2~(25) message modifications, no collision have been found. According to second preimage attack simulation on AES-EMAC no collision found between EMAC value of S_1 and S_2, i.e. no second preimage found for messages that have been tested. Based on distinguishing attack simulation on truncated AES-EMAC we found collision in every message therefore we cannot distinguish truncated AES-EMAC with random function. Second-preimage attack is successfully performed on truncated AES-EMAC.
机译:在本文中,我们显示CBC-MAC上的频道可以应用于加密的消息认证码(EMAC)方案。 EMAC计划一般易于区分攻击和第二次预报攻击。使用2〜(25)消息修改,在AES-EMAC上区分攻击模拟,未找到碰撞。根据AES-EMAC的第二次预报攻击模拟,在S_1和S_2的EMAC值之间没有发现碰撞,即找不到已经测试的消息的第二个前缀。基于在截断AES-EMAC上的区分攻击模拟我们发现每条消息中的碰撞因此我们无法将截断的AES-EMAC与随机函数区分开来。第二次预测攻击在截断的AES-EMAC上成功执行。

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