FISHING AGREEMENTS AND MACROECONOMIC DEPENDENCE: A GAME THEORY APPROACH OF THE EU-ACP FRAMEWORK

摘要

Since January 2008, the fishing agreements between the European Union and ACP (African, Caribbean, Pacific) countries have changed to comply with WTO rules and improve the management of the fisheries. However, the poor countries depend perhaps too heavily on foreign aids to impose any management system to the distant water fishing nations. A classical game theory approach (fishwar model) is revisited to take into consideration the macroeconomic dependence of developing countries and identify the theoretical conditions (time preferences, compensatory payment level, negotiation leadership) under which the stock can increase and the countries share the resources. In this game, each ACP country has its own EEZ of a natural stock and can fish on its ownor partly sell the access to the EU fleet (quota) against a compensatory amount. The Nash equilibrium context is compared to two Stackelberg settings.