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Effect of epidemic dynamics on evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game in scale-free networks

机译:流行性动力对无规模网络中进化囚犯困境游戏的影响

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This paper studies the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game (PDG) in finite dynamic scale-free networks, where the dynamic property is fulfilled by considering an epidemic process in networks. When a person is in infected state, he will not play PDG. Only healthy persons play PDG with their healthy neighbors. Our simulations show that (ⅰ) the ratio of healthy persons, R_s, depends not only on the spreading rate λ, but also on the recovery rate δ; (ⅱ) The relationship between cooperation behaviors and the spreading rate λ depends on the value of δ; (ⅲ) Given the same value of R_s and payoff parameter b, the cooperation frequency f changes with δ; (ⅳ) Some curves of f against R_s are monotonic while others are non-monotonic. We have qualitatively explained results (ⅱ)-(ⅳ) through competition mechanism of cooperation enhancement effect and cooperation suppression effect. Our work sheds some lights on the important effect of dynamic topology on evolutionary game.
机译:本文研究了进化囚犯在有限的无尺度网络中的困境游戏(PDG),通过考虑网络中的流行过程来满足动态性质。当一个人处于感染状态时,他不会扮演PDG。只有健康的人用健康的邻居玩PDG。我们的模拟表明,(Ⅰ)健康人R_S的比例不仅取决于扩散率λ,还取决于恢复率δ; (Ⅱ)合作行为与扩频率λ之间的关系取决于δ的值; (Ⅲ)鉴于R_S和支付参数B的相同值,合作频率F随Δ而变化; (ⅳ)F对抗R_S的一些曲线是单调的,而其他则是非单调的。通过合作增强效应与合作抑制效应的竞争机制,我们有定性解释的结果(Ⅱ) - (ⅳ)。我们的工作揭示了动态拓扑对进化游戏的重要作用。

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