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Study on Revenue-Sharing Contract Based on Downside-Risk-Averse Agents under the 'Farmers + Company' Model

机译:“农户+公司”模式下基于负风险厌恶主体的收益分成合同研究

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With the development of biomass energy industry in China, the research of contract design, concerning biomass energy raw crop in "farmers + company" model, is significant both practically and theoretically. This paper, taking in the consideration of the practical situation between company and farmer in China, establishes a two-stage supply chain under the revenue-sharing model based on economics and game theory. And optimum order quantity with related coefficients is calculated under risk neutral case and downside-risk-averse case. This is followed by a numerical ex-ample to verify the research before. Ultimately, an optimal coordination strategy is concluded, which promotes the advance and development of biomass energy industry in China.
机译:随着中国生物质能源产业的发展,以“农民+公司”模式研究生物质能源原料作物的合同设计研究在实践和理论上都具有重要意义。本文结合中国企业与农民之间的实际情况,基于经济学和博弈论,建立了收益共享模式下的两阶段供应链。并在风险中性和规避风险的情况下,计算出具有相关系数的最优订货量。接下来是一个数字示例,以验证之前的研究。最终,得出了最优的协调策略,从而促进了中国生物质能源产业的发展。

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