Recent international recommendations documents, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (reference 1), recommend that facility operators develop and implement means and procedures for evaluations, including performance testing, but it is not typically clear what capabilities and resources that the State and the operator need to have in place before evaluations and performance testing can be performed effectively. From our experience, it has been common to assume that training in basic evaluation techniques, combined with training on modeling and simulation tools is sufficient to allow operators to perform evaluations. This is only part of the picture. As the paper describes, an operator's procedures for evaluation need a good theoretical basis, compatibility with the State's graded approach for security and associated regulations, good data from a number of sources, and training of several categories of stakeholders to include those that perform the evaluations. The State also should adopt a process for reviewing and approving security plans and performing inspections that is technically capable of understanding the evaluation and supporting documentation. Finally, the Design Basis Threat or Threat Assessment needs to be detailed enough to support the evaluation. The paper discusses each of these considerations in more detail below and describes how both State and operator can address the issues. The paper also suggests the staged incorporation of modeling and simulation tools which should be incorporated into the evaluation process only after the need is present and adequate resources are in place to effectively use those tools. A simple training curriculum is also described.
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