The 45-year old NPT anchors states’ commitment to prevent the diversion of nuclearenergy to nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s 40-year old Model Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreement (CSA) premises its verification standard on the early detection of diversion ofnuclear material to nuclear weapons or purposes unknown. The Agency’s mission inensuring that nuclear uses remain solely peaceful has been challenged and remains thecase in North Korea, Iran, and Syria. There are lessons to be drawn from the IAEA’sinspection process concerning these countries, and in that context, future adjustments ofsafeguards methods to consider. The IAEA conducted inspections in Iran under the CSAwith and without an Additional Protocol (AP), in Syria under the CSA, and in NorthKorea under the CSA with certain restrictions. In all three cases, the Agency soughttransparency visits in the early stages to understand claims on possible undeclaredactivities, and pursued added measures in later years. While there are similarities in allthe three dossiers, there are also differences. The IAEA’s state-level approachimplemented across the board over the last decade is the result of creating betterunderstanding of each state’s nuclear activities. Internally, safeguards methods have alsoevolved from a material accountancy approach to a more pro-active, analytical andcomprehensive evaluation process. Examples are given on a range of issues that theIAEA seeks to advance its safeguards approach. These include: emerging verificationproblems; use and sharing of third party information; issues associated with IAEAreporting practices; and states’ deception and concealment strategies.
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