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Analysis Of Information Game between Supervisor and Futures Exchange under the Excessive Speculation Market

机译:投机市场过多下监管者与期货交易所之间的信息博弈分析

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Information speculation is one that the main participators move around the authenticity, the integrity, the timeliness and the validity of information in futures speculation market .This movement system includes information producing, information dissemination and information using. Under the excessive speculating market environment, the futures market supervisor and the futures exchange are different to the assurance criterion of market speculation because of the risk differences. So that there are information speculation between the futures market supervisor and the futures exchange. The analysis on information speculation between the futures market supervisor and the futures exchange indicated that the main reason of the excessive speculation doesn't only originate from "the advantage hobby" of the futures exchange, but also stems from "the initiative good will" of the exchange to the futures market supervisor for own existing, and this behavior wins "the conscience asylum" of the supervisor. Therefore, it must attack to the excessive speculation behavior and strengthen the market supervisor cooperation, the futures market would develop continually, stably and healthfully.
机译:信息投机是期货投机市场中主要参与者围绕信息的真实性,完整性,及时性和有效性进行移动的一种。该移动系统包括信息产生,信息传播和信息使用。在过度投机的市场环境下,由于风险的差异,期货市场的监管者和期货交易所与市场投机的保证标准有所不同。从而在期货市场主管和期货交易所之间进行信息投机。对期货市场主管与期货交易所信息投机的分析表明,过度投机的主要原因不仅来自期货交易所的“利益爱好”,而且来源于期货交易所的“主动善意”。与自己现有的期货市场主管进行交换,这种行为赢得了主管的“良心庇护”。因此,必须打击过度的投机行为,加强市场监管者的合作,期货市场才能持续,稳定,健康地发展。

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