Vehicular networks are used to coordinate actions among vehicles in trafficby the use of wireless transceivers (pairs of transmitters and receivers).Unfortunately, the wireless communication among vehicles is vulnerable tosecurity threats that may lead to very serious safety hazards. In this work, wepropose a viable solution for coping with Man-in-the-Middle attacks.Conventionally, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is utilized for a securecommunication with the pre-certified public key. However, a securevehicle-to-vehicle communication requires additional means of verification inorder to avoid impersonation attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is thefirst work that proposes to certify both the public key and out-of-bandsense-able static attributes to enable mutual authentication of thecommunicating vehicles. Vehicle owners are bound to preprocess (periodically) acertificate for both a public key and a list of fixed unchangeable attributesof the vehicle. Furthermore, the proposed approach is shown to be adaptablewith regards to the existing authentication protocols. We illustrate thesecurity verification of the proposed protocol using a detailed proof in Spicalculus.
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