In this paper we extend the framework of evolutionary inspection game putforward recently by the author and coworkers to a large class of conflictinteractions dealing with the pressure executed by the major player (orprincipal) on the large group of small players that can resist this pressure orcollaborate with the major player. We prove rigorous results on the convergenceof various Markov decision models of interacting small agents (includingevolutionary growth), namely pairwise, in groups and by coalition formation, toa deterministic evolution on the distributions of the state spaces of smallplayers paying main attention to situations with an infinite state-space ofsmall players. We supply rather precise rates of convergence. The theoreticalresults of the paper are applied to the analysis of the processes ofinspection, corruption, cyber-security, counter-terrorism, banks and firmsmerging, strategically enhanced preferential attachment and many other.
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