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Minority Game of price promotions in fast moving consumer goods markets

机译:快速消费品市场价格促销的少数民族游戏

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摘要

A variation of the Minority Game has been applied to study the timing ofpromotional actions at retailers in the fast moving consumer goods market. Theunderlying hypotheses for this work are that price promotions are moreeffective when fewer than average competitors do a promotion, and that apromotion strategy can be based on past sales data. The first assumption hasbeen checked by analysing 1467 promotional actions for three products on theDutch market (ketchup, mayonnaise and curry sauce) over a 120-week period, bothon an aggregated level and on retailer chain level. The second assumption was tested by analysing past sales data with theMinority Game. This revealed that high or low competitor promotional pressurefor actual ketchup, mayonnaise, curry sauce and barbecue sauce markets is tosome extent predictable up to a forecast of some 10 weeks. Whereas a randomguess would be right 50% of the time, a single-agent game can predict themarket with a success rate of 56% for a 6 to 9 week forecast. This number isthe same for all four mentioned fast moving consumer markets. For a multi-agentgame a larger variability in the success rate is obtained, but predictabilitycan be as high as 65%. Contrary to expectation, the actual market does the opposite of what gametheory would predict. This points at a systematic oscillation in the market.Even though this result is not fully understood, merely observing that thistrend is present in the data could lead to exploitable trading benefits. As acheck, random history strings were generated from which the statisticalvariation in the game prediction was studied. This shows that the odds are1:1,000,000 that the observed pattern in the market is based on coincidence.
机译:少数族裔博弈的一种变体已被用于研究快速消费品市场中零售商的促销行动时间。这项工作的基本假设是,当促销的数量少于一般竞争对手时,价格促销会更有效,促销策略可以基于过去的销售数据。通过对120个星期内的三种产品(番茄酱,蛋黄酱和咖喱酱)在荷兰市场上的总和零售连锁层次的促销行动进行分析,检验了第一个假设。通过使用少数派游戏分析过去的销售数据来测试第二个假设。这表明,竞争对手对实际番茄酱,蛋黄酱,咖喱酱和烧烤酱市场的促销压力在一定程度上是可以预测的,可以预测到大约10周。尽管随机猜测在50%的时间内是正确的,但单人游戏可以预测市场,在6到9周的预测中成功率为56%。对于所有提到的四个快速发展的消费市场,这个数字都是相同的。对于多人游戏,成功率会有较大的变化,但可预测性可高达65%。与预期相反,实际市场与博弈论所预测的相反。这表明市场出现了系统性的振荡。即使尚未完全理解此结果,仅观察到数据中存在这种趋势也可能会导致可利用的交易收益。作为检查,将生成随机历史记录字符串,从中可以研究游戏预测中的统计差异。这表明,市场中观察到的模式基于巧合的几率是1:1,000,000。

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