"This paper uses data collected from a series of public auctions of used cars in New Jersey to examine how strategic bidding affects price determination in open-outcry English auctions. "Jumps" in the bidding, which occur when a new offer exceeds the old offer by more than the minimum bid increment, are highly pervasive and consistently related to the item's presale estimated price. The size of the jumps is not affected by the selling order, however. This jump bidding pattern suggests that open-outcry auctions are more appropriately interpreted with models that assume common-item valuations rather than models assuming private valuations. "("JEL "D44) Copyright (c) 2007 Western Economic Association International.
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机译：“本文使用从新泽西州二手车的一系列公开拍卖中收集的数据，来研究战略竞标如何影响公开喊价英语拍卖中的价格确定。竞标中的“跳跃”发生在新报价超过旧报价时。跳动幅度大于最小竞标价格，并且与商品的预售估计价格始终相关。但是，跳动幅度不受卖单的影响。这种跳动竞标模式表明对公开竞价拍卖的解释更为恰当“（” JEL“ D44）版权所有（c）2007 Western Western Association International。
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