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Supplier competition with option contracts for discrete blocks of capacity

机译:供应商与离散容量块的期权合同竞争

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摘要

When a firm faces an uncertain demand, it is common to procure supply using some type of option in addition to spot purchases. A typical version of this problem involves capacity being purchased in advance, with a separate payment made that applies only to the part of the capacity that is needed. We consider a discrete version of this problem in which competing suppliers choose a reservation price and an execution price for blocks of capacity, and the buyer, facing known distributions of demand and spot price, needs to decide which blocks to reserve. We show how to solve the buyer's (combinatorial) problem efficiently and also show that suppliers can do no better than offer blocks at execution prices that match their costs, making profits only from the reservation part of their bids. Finally we show that in an equilibrium the buyer selects the welfare maximizing set of blocks.
机译:当企业面临不确定的需求时,除了现货购买外,通常还使用某种类型的期权来获取供应。此问题的典型版本涉及预先购买容量,并且单独付款仅适用于所需容量的一部分。我们考虑这个问题的离散版本,其中竞争的供应商为容量块选择保留价格和执行价格,而面对已知的需求和现货价格分布的买方需要确定要保留的块。我们展示了如何有效地解决买方(组合)问题,并且还展示了供应商所能做的就是提供与其价格相匹配的执行价格,而仅从投标的保留部分中获利。最后,我们证明了在均衡状态下,购买者选择了福利最大化的组块。

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