Great Expectations, Predictable Outcomes and the G20's Response to the RecentudGlobal Financial Crisis: When Matters Relating to Liquidity Risks BecomeudEqually as Important as Measures Addressing Pro cyclicality.

摘要

The meeting of the Governors and Heads of Supervision on the 12 September 2010, their decisionsudin relation to the new capital framework known as Basel III, as well as the endorsement of theudagreements reached on the 26 July 2010, once again, reflect the typical situation where greatudexpectations with rather unequivocal, and in a sense, disappointing results are delivered. Theudoutcome of various consultations by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, consultationsudwhich culminated in the present Basel III framework, also reflect the focus on measures aimed atudaddressing problems attributed to Basel II, that is, measures aimed at mitigating pro cyclicality.udThis is rather astonishing given one critical lesson which has been drawn from the recent FinancialudCrisis: namely, that capital measures on their own, were and are insufficient in addressing andudaverting the Financial Crisis. Furthermore, banks which have been complying with capitaludadequacy requirements could still face severe liquidity problems.udAs well as an increase of the minimum common equity requirement from 2% to 4.5%, the recentudagreement and decisions of the Governors and Heads of Supervision also include the stipulationudthat banks hold a capital conservation buffer of 2.5% - hence consolidating the stronger definitionudof capital (as agreed in the previous meeting held by the Governors and Heads of Supervisionudearlier in July 2010).