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Sanctions and Signals: How International Sanction Threats Trigger Domestic Protest in Targeted Regimes

机译:制裁与信号:国际制裁威胁如何在有针对性的体制下引发国内抗议

摘要

Western powers often turn to international sanctions in order to exert pressure on incumbent governments and signal their support for the opposition. Yet whether, and through what mechanisms, sanctions trigger protest remains unclear. We argue that sanction threats work as an international stamp of approval for would-be protesters; they encourage collective action against governments. Moreover, sanction threats send particularly clear and coherent signals if multiple senders issue them and if they focus on human rights, which makes such sanctions threats more effective in sparking social unrest. Using count models of protest activity, we find strong support for our arguments. We corroborate our findings with qualitative evidence from the case of Zimbabwe.
机译:西方列强经常转向国际制裁,以对现任政府施加压力并表示他们支持反对派。但是,制裁是否以及通过何种机制引发抗议尚不清楚。我们认为,制裁威胁是准抗议者的国际认可。他们鼓励对政府采取集体行动。此外,如果多个发件人发布制裁威胁,或者如果它们关注人权,制裁威胁就会发出特别清晰和连贯的信号,这使制裁威胁更有效地引发了社会动荡。使用抗议活动的计数模型,我们发现我们的论点有力支持。我们用来自津巴布韦的定性证据来证实我们的发现。

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