This paper argues that through the conceptual distinctions between u27immanenceu27 and u27transcendenceu27 in The Idea of Phenomenology and The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, a proper understanding of transcendental idealism and u27transcendence in immanenceu27 can avoid any metaphysical commitments of internalism or externalism, and reconfigure the debate on internalism and externalism by providing an alternative option. There are two interpretations towards whether Husserl is an internalist. The first one is that Husserl is an internalist as he employs the reduction method in order to u27returns to the inner mindu27. The second interpretation, which is most welcomed by Husserlians, refutes the internalistic interpretation of Husserl and argues that neither internalism nor externalism can faithfully understand Husserlu27s phenomenology because Husserlu27s phenomenology does not tie to any tradition metaphysical commitment. Although I share this view, but an important text, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology is neglected by the previous debates. In the text, it does not only reexamine the two levels of u27immanenceu27 and u27transcendenceu27 in The Idea of Phenomenology, but also introduces one more level of u27immanenceu27 and u27transcendenceu27. I shall argue that by the reconsideration of the three levels of immanence and transcendence, Husserl does not disconnect u27transcendenceu27, so he cannot simply be employed into internalism, on the one hand; his phenomenology provides an alternative option rather than internalism or externalism.
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