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Making or breaking climate targets: The AMPERE study on staged accession scenarios for climate policy

机译:制定或打破气候目标:AMPERE对分阶段加入气候政策情景的研究

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摘要

This study explores a situation of staged accession to a global climate policy regime from the current situation of regionally fragmented and moderate climate action. The analysis is based on scenarios in which a front runner coalition -- the EU or the EU and China -- embarks on immediate ambitious climate action while the rest of the world makes a transition to a global climate regime between 2030 and 2050. We assume that the ensuing regime involves strong mitigation efforts but does not require late joiners to compensate for their initially higher emissions. Thus, climate targets are relaxed, and although staged accession can achieve significant reductions of global warming, the resulting climate outcome is unlikely to be consistent with the goal of limiting global warming to 2 degrees. The addition of China to the front runner coalition can reduce pre-2050 excess emissions by 20.30%, increasing the likelihood of staying below 2 degrees. Not accounting for potential co-benefits, the cost of front runner action is found to be lower for the EU than for China. Regions that delay their accession to the climate regime face a trade-off between reduced short term costs and higher transitional requirements due to larger carbon lock-ins and more rapidly increasing carbon prices during the accession period.
机译:这项研究从区域零散和温和的气候行动的当前状况探讨了逐步加入全球气候政策制度的情况。该分析基于以下场景:欧盟或中国与欧盟先行采取立即雄心勃勃的气候行动,而世界其他地区则在2030年至2050年之间过渡到全球气候体制。随之而来的制度包括强有力的减排努力,但不需要后期加入者来补偿其最初的较高排放量。因此,放宽了气候目标,尽管分阶段加入可以实现全球变暖的显着减少,但由此产生的气候结果不太可能与将全球变暖限制在2度的目标相一致。将中国加入领跑者联盟可以使2050年前的过剩排放量减少20.30%,从而增加了保持低于2度的可能性。不考虑潜在的共同利益,欧盟的前锋行动成本比中国低。由于更大的碳锁定和加入期间碳价格的快速上涨,推迟加入气候制度的地区面临着短期成本降低和过渡要求更高之间的权衡问题。

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