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Different Effects of Contractual Form on Public Transport Satisfaction: Evidence from Large- and Medium-Sized Cities in China

机译:合同形式对公共交通满意度的不同影响:来自中国大中城市的证据

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摘要

This paper discusses and explores the different effects of contractual forms on the satisfaction with public transport (PT) at different urban scales. Using public transport systems in 12cities in China as the focus (four large-I-sized cities, four large-II-sized cities, and four medium-sized cities), a measurement model of the passenger satisfaction index (PSI) is constructed and estimated on the basic of the adjusted European Customer Satisfaction Index (ECSI) and Partial least square-structural equation model (PLS-SEM), respectively. Then, a two-stage truncation regression bootstrap model is proposed to assess the different effects between them. The major findings of this study are summarized as follows: (1) different effects of contractual forms on PT satisfaction in large- and medium-sized cities are confirmed. (2) In large-I-sized cities and lager II sized cities, operators supervised by management contracts incite higher PT satisfaction levels than those supervised by gross and net cost contracts. (3) In medium-sized cities, operators supervised by gross cost contracts provide incentives to be the satisfaction compared to those of management and net cost contracts. According to different urban scales, different and appropriate contractual forms and supervision mechanisms should be chosen to regulate public transport services.
机译:本文讨论并探讨了不同城市规模对公共交通(PT)满意度的不同影响。在中国12Cities中使用公共交通系统作为重点(四个大型城市,四个大型城市,四个城市和四个中等城市),建造了乘客满意度指数(PSI)的测量模型和估计调整后欧洲客户满意度指数(ECSI)和部分最小二乘 - 结构方程模型(PLS-SEM)的基本估计。然后,提出了一个两阶段截断回归引导模型来评估它们之间的不同效果。本研究的主要结果总结如下:(1)合同形式对大型城市PT满意度的不同影响。 (2)在大型城市和Lager II大小的城市中,管理合同监督的运营商比毛额和净成本合同监督的人煽动更高的PT满意度。 (3)在中等城市中,由总成本合约监督的运营商提供了与管理层和净成本合同相比的满意度的激励措施。根据不同的城市规模,应选择不同和适当的合同形式和监督机制来规范公共交通服务。

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